Die japanische Notstandsgesetzgebung

Abstract

One of the most controversial points of the current debate on the reform of the Japanese  Constitution is the question of whether a “state of emergency” should be regulated in  the constitution. Until now, no such constitutional provision has existed in Japan. When  the Japanese Constitution took effect in 1946, there was no need to regulate emergency  powers as the defense of Japanese territory and the maintenance of public order were  guaranteed by the Allied Powers after the end of the war. In the time after the enactment  of  the  constitution,  it  was  taboo  to  consider  a  constitutional  regulation  of  emergency  powers.  Every  governmental  initiative  of  this  kind  led  to  fierce  protest  from  the  Japanese public. The debate on the correct course of Japanese defense policy changed  only after the Gulf War of 1990/ 1991 and the emerging fear of North Korean atomic  bombs had led to a change of public consciousness.  This allowed the enactment of the  three so-called “emergency laws” to close the perceived constitutional gap. The three  emergency laws provide for a broad range of measures in the case of an armed attack  on Japanese territory or other similar state of emergency such as a natural disaster. As  the  regulation  of  a  state  of  emergency  ordinarily  provides  for  the  centralization  of  powers  in  the  event  of  an  emergency,  which  differs  from  the  normal  separation  of  powers  laid  down  by  the  constitution,  it  seems  problematic  to  close  a  perceived  constitutional void by enacting sub-constitutional  laws. The article studies whether the  emergency laws are in conflict with the constitution and attempts to predict the content  of a future constitutional provision on emergency powers in Japan.