Denial of “Interpretative Discretion” in Japanese Law

Is it Really Different from Chevron Deference?

Abstract

It is a common understanding in Japanese law that administrative agencies have no discretion in statutory interpretation (the denial of interpretative discretion). On the other hand, U.S. case law (Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.) states that courts must defer to an administrative agency’s permissible interpretations of a statute unless the intent of Congress is sufficiently clear. The two doctrines are seemingly incompatible.
This paper starts from the premise that the semantic meaning of “interpretation of the law” should be limited to formulating abstract and general propositions. It then analyses the semantics of administrative discretion from that perspective and examines Japanese Supreme Court judgments concerning administrative standards and discretion in administrative dispositions. It turns out that there may be no substantial difference between denying versus recognizing interpretative discretion. Instead, the true question should be, when is it appropriate for the courts to adopt an interpretation that gives the executive wide latitude to act?