Neuregelung von Aufsicht, Rechtsdurchsetzung und Finanzdienstleistungen in Japan
Abstract
The reform of state supervisory institutions in the capital and financial market is a current topic in many countries, including Japan and Germany. This paper outlines the reasons for and the implementation of recent reforms in Japan, and points out some major differences among supervisory institutions in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain.
Common trends in Europe, the U.S., and Japan are the continuing deregulation and liberation in the financial sector as well as the integration of supervisory authorities. Recently, for instance, in Germany the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin), in Great Britain the Financial Service Authority, and in Japan the Kin’yû-chô (in English often called “Financial Services Agency”)were founded, each of which now combines supervisory authorities over the insurance, banking, and securities sectors in these countries. Although one can find remarkable differences in the regulation and supervision of the financial market in Germany and Great Britain, the differences between these countries and those such as Japan and the U.S. that once incorporated a separate banking system are even more fundamental.
In Japan, the statutory principle of separation of banking and securities businesses was eventually essentially abolished in 1994, after twenty years of a creeping reform process. Ever since, banks have been allowed to indirectly engage in the securities business and securities firms in the banking business by establishing separate but affiliated companies that deal with the related business. Until 2001, the general supervisory authority over the different financial sectors in Japan was the Ministry of Finance (Ôkura-shô). Then this ministry was divided into a new Ministry of Finance that is mainly in charge of tax and budget affairs and the above-mentioned Financial Services Agency (Kin’yû-chô),which supervises all parts of the financial sector.
In contrast to the development in Germany and Great Britain, the reason for splitting up the old Ministry of Finance and establishing a separate financial supervisory authority on the one hand and a new Ministry of Finance with limited competences on the other hand was not primarily the need for a more effective supervisory institution, but the aim to reduce and devolve power. In the past, the Ministry of Finance was one of the mightiest authorities in Japan, controlling internal politics on a large scale. At present, neither the Ministry of Finance nor the Financial Services Agency has sufficient power and stamina to initiate and executeur gently needed reforms in the Japanese financial sector. While the Ministry of Finance’s power declined, the Japanese Prime Minister formally gained power and influence. He himself and his agency now directly oversee the Financial Services Agency. That was also one of the aims for the reform of the Ministry of Finance. However, problems have emerged because Japanese prime ministers are usually not as decisive as political leaders in other countries.
For instance, little progress has been made in coming to terms with the issue of bad debts, from which Japan’s banks and companies are still suffering. Neither Hakuo Yanigasawa, Minister of Finance from1998 to 2002, nor his successor in charge of financial affairs, Heizô Takenaka, present Minister for Financial Services, has been able to solve the problem sufficiently. The efforts to overcome the crisis of Japanese banks seems to be an especially severe problem. This is demonstrated by the recent handling of the nearly insolvent Resona bank case by government authorities.
(The Editors)
